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1A central lesson drawn from the experience of the decades between the World Wars was
that the economic and political fate of the world could not safely be entrusted to unregulated, free
market national and global economic systems. History warned that this was a path to economic
instability, global depression and political chaos. In the aftermath of World War II, national
economies, even those in which markets played a very powerful role, would be placed under the
ultimate control of governments, while international economic relations would be consciously
managed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. Trade was expected to rise
in importance, but it was thought at the time that the degree of global financial integration would
remain modest, with cross border money flows under tight government control. The global
prosperity that characterized the quarter century following the war -- the “Golden Age” of modern
capitalism -- reinforced belief in the wisdom of social regulation of economic affairs.
The economic instability that erupted in the 1970s as the structures of the Golden Age
unraveled has led us back to the future. The troubles of that decade created a powerful movement,
led by business and, especially, financial interests, to roll back the economic regulatory power of
the state, replacing conscious societal control with the “invisible hand” of unregulated markets --
just as in the period preceding the Great Depression. Though governments still play a large role in
most economies, they have ceded an enormous proportion of their economic power to global
markets and private interests. The economic theory used to guide and justify this transformation is
known as Neoliberalism. Neoliberal enthusiasts promised that this new laissez-faire era would
dramatically improve economic performance in both developed and developing countries.
Unfortunately, these promises have not been kept.
This essay begins with a brief overview of the standard arguments for and against global
Neoliberalism and an overview of economic performance in the Neoliberal era. Section II argues
that the micro theory appropriate to an analysis of the likely effects of global liberalization is not
the neoclassical theory of perfectly competitive markets relied on by Neoliberal supporters, but
Joseph Schumpeter’s theory of “natural oligopolies.” Section III presents a theory of the structural
contradictions of global Neoliberalism that integrates a Keynesian-Marxian macro perspective with
Schumpeterian and Marxian micro theory. The last section considers the political and policy
2implications of the analysis. 
I. The Great Debate Over Global Neoliberalism
There are two distinct and logically incompatible theoretical perspectives used by
Neoliberals in defense of their call for maximum deregulation, liberalization, privatization and
global economic integration. Neoclassical or Walrasian general equilibrium theory, which finds its
most rigorous formalization in the revered models of Arrow and Debreau, is by far the most
influential and widely used theoretical underpinning for the Neoliberal position. It is the only fully
specified and widely sanctioned theoretical paradigm offered by economists to justify their support
for Neoliberalism. The IMF and World Bank rely on Neoclassical general equilibrium models to
support Neoliberal policies, and such models are the stock in trade of the international trade and
labor economists who tout globalization’s benefits.
There is a second set of arguments, based partly on Schumpeterian ideas about innovation,
economies of scale, the positive effects of monopoly power, and the inefficiency of marginal cost
pricing, that have been used to defend Neoliberalism. These are examined below.
In the standard Neoliberal view, absent government interference, both national economies
and the integrated global economy are believed to operate efficiently, more or less like the models
of a perfectly competitive market system found in neoclassical micro economic textbooks. In an
unregulated economy with maximum competitive intensity, relative price and profit signals create
micro economic efficiency: resources flow to their most productive possible uses. Competitive
pressures also keep factor markets at or near market clearing; in equilibrium, there is full
employment and optimal capacity utilization. Since interest rates, set in efficient financial markets,
assure that investment will equal saving at full capacity output, Say’s Law is valid. Aggregate
demand always equals full capacity aggregate supply. Given Say’s Law, full employment is assured,
and inflation control becomes the only legitimate macro policy objective. To contain inflation,
Neoliberals support reliance on monetary rather than fiscal policy, and the independence of
Central Banks from democratically elected officials. 
When fully liberalized, global financial markets will allocate world savings efficiently.
3Therefore, as Neoliberalism progresses, real interest rates should decline (once inflation is
defeated), investment should rise, and the flow of funds from the capital rich North to the
resource rich South should increase. The most productive investment projects will be funded, no
matter where in the world they are located.
Since markets allocate resources efficiently, developing country governments are urged to
end their reliance on industrial policy. “Getting prices wrong,” as Alice Amsden (1989) put it, in
an attempt to construct dynamic comparative advantage is seen as a sure way to destroy
development prospects. Replacing state economic guidance with liberalized markets will thus
improve output and productivity growth rates in the less developed world.
In sum, defenders of global Neoliberalism argued that it would raise real GDP,
productivity, and investment growth rates well above their values in the troubled 1970s, equaling
or perhaps exceeding Golden Age performance, while eventually lowering unemployment,
inflation and real interest rates. Financial markets would become more stable. Economic
performance in developing countries would improve as capital and technology flows their way,
creating eventual convergence between North and South.
Section II critically evaluates key Neoliberal micro economic hypotheses. Here I simply
observe that even most mainstream economists now acknowledge that, given asymmetric
information and principal-agent conflict, markets do not always clear, or generate Pareto optimal
prices, even in equilibrium. Keynesian and Marxian critics of macro economic aspects of
Neoliberalism argue that Say’s Law has no legitimate defense, even as a crude approximation to
empirical reality. Therefore, as the world discovered to its dismay in the Great Depression and its
delight in the Golden Age, the state must use macro policy in pursuit of rapid growth and full
employment or these objectives will not be consistently achieved. Ceding to monetary policy
almost complete responsibility for demand management, while declaring price stability to be the
sole legitimate macro policy objective, will retard long-term growth, raise the risk of financial
instability, and perhaps even lead at some point to a new depression. Needless to say, a defense of
the necessity of government aggregate demand management does not imply either that state
economic institutions and policies are always adequate for this crucial task, or that all governments
4at all times have had the technical and organizational capacity -- or the political will -- to do the job
effectively. Government regulation of aggregate demand is a necessary, but not a sufficient,
condition for healthy, egalitarian growth.
Critics argue that financial markets are inherently unstable because the current value of
long lived financial assets depend solely on peoples’ expectations of their future values, and such
expectations are bounded only by non-market institutions and social conventions.1 This is one
reason why strong Central Banks were created, why a qualitative increase in US government
financial regulation took place after the financial crisis of the early 1930s, why the Bretton Woods
system was adopted after World War II, and why tight government regulation of financial markets
and control of cross border capital flows were virtually ubiquitous in the Golden Age.
Every development success in the post World War II period, from the high growth Latin
American countries in the Golden Age through the economic ‘miracles’ of East Asia, relied on
anti-liberal, state guided growth. But IMF, World Bank, and WTO pressures plus widespread
financial liberalization are making it impossible to maintain state guided growth, and therefore
impossible to achieve economic development. Moreover, financial liberalization creates speculative
boom-bust cycles that constrain capital investment and lower average growth rates. In the
Neoliberal era, “financial crises seem to occur with almost monotonous regularity,” The Economist
recently observed.2 It is widely acknowledged that liberalization of domestic financial markets and
cross border capital flows was a key cause of the Asian crisis.
In a world of non-clearing markets, key macro variables are determined through the
complex interaction of private and public institutions and practices. Section III of this paper argues
that in the Golden Age, a virtuous circle was formed connecting rapid aggregate demand growth
under government Keynesian macro policy management, ‘corespective’ (or partly cooperative)
relations among firms in important oligopolistic industries, and worker friendly or high-road
enterprise-labor relations. In stark contrast, Neoliberal globalization has created a dynamic
interaction among pro-business states (that consider low inflation the only worthwhile macro
policy objective), fierce or cutthroat competition in most globally contested markets, and anti-
worker, low road labor relations. This triad constitutes an economic vicious circle that makes it
5impossible to sustain rapid growth, full employment, high investment spending, rapid productivity
growth, and distributional equity.
Critics concluded that the extensive liberalization and global integration sought by
Neoliberals would lead to the following developments. Inflation obsessed independent Central
Banks and instability in global financial markets would keep real interest rates high. With macro
policies no longer focused on growth, real GDP and productivity would fail to rise at Golden Age
rates. High unemployment, in concert with weaker unions and low road labor relations, would
slow real wage growth and raise inequality. Financial markets would become unusually unstable.
Developing countries that adopted Neoliberal principles would experience slow long-term growth,
greater instability, and sharply rising inequality. These problems were not believed to be the
inevitable result of greater global integration. Rather, they would be caused by the uniquely
destructive mode of integration associated with Neoliberalism. 
Which Side Has the Best Case?: A Brief Look at the Data
Now that the Neoliberal revolution is two decades old, it seems reasonable to ask whether
the optimistic predictions of its supporters or the fears of its opponents have been justified by
experience.
The evidence to date supports Neoliberalism’s critics. The promised benefits of
Neoliberalism have yet to materialize, at least not for the majority of the world’s people. Global
income growth has slowed, as has the rate of growth of capital accumulation, productivity growth
has deteriorated, real wage growth has declined, inequality has risen in most countries, real interest
rates are higher, financial crises erupt with increasing regularity, the less developed nations outside
East Asia have fallen even further behind the advanced, and average unemployment has risen.
The problem is not that the globalization process is too immature to significantly affect
economic performance. Liberalization has proceeded at an impressive pace in the past two
decades.3 For example, financial capital has become extraordinarily mobile. In 1977, in the midst
of petrodollar recycling, about $18 billion of currency trades took place daily; in 1989, it was $590
billion. By 1998, $1.5 trillion moved across borders every day. And foreign direct investment flows,
which averaged $50 billion a year in 1981-85, rose to $160 billion annually in 1986-91, and were
6$331 billion in 1995.4
 Not surprisingly, such hyperactive capital flows have been accompanied by increased
volatility of exchange rates, and frequent bouts of domestic and international financial instability.
The Neoliberal era has been characterized by the near continuous outbreak of financial crises.
Martin Wolff of the Financial Times summed up a late 1998 World Bank report on the Asian
crisis as follows: 
Three crucial lessons can be drawn from the report. It is surprisingly difficult for countries
embarking on financial liberalization to avoid disasters. When they succumb, it is no less
difficult to escape economic depressions. If short-term capital flows are not tamed, such
crises are certain to reoccur.5
But freedom of capital flows has not brought lower real interest rates as promised. For the
G7 nations, for example, real long term interest rates averaged about 2.6% from 1959-70, and
0.4% from 1971-82, but jumped to 5.6% in the 1982-89 period, and averaged 4% from 1990-97.6
High interest rates are one reason why inequality has risen in recent decades; ever larger shares of
national income are being transferred from workers and other income claimants to owners of
financial assets, who are the richest group in society.
With both real interest rates and exchange volatility risk so high, it is not surprising that
most studies report a slowdown in capital investment. According to World Bank data, the annual
rate of growth of world real gross domestic investment was 7.0% from 1966 to 1973 at the end of
the Golden Age. It then fell to 2.2% from 1974 to 1979, rose modestly to 2.8% from 1980 to
1989, then fell slightly to 2.7% from 1990 through 1996, the last year for which data is available.7
Investment growth was especially sluggish in the developed world. OECD countries had an average
annual growth of real gross capital formation of 6.3% in 1960-73, 1.5% in 1973-79, 2.4% in 1979-
89, and 1.5% in 1989-95.8
Other crucial performance indicators display the same pattern. For example, the
unemployment rate in OECD countries was 3.2% in 1960-73, 5% in 1973-79, 7.2% in 1979-89,
and 7.1% in 1989-95.9 The growth of labor productivity, a crucial economic indicator, also
deteriorated in the Neoliberal era. In the OECD area, it was 4.6% in 1960-73, 1.8% in 1973-79,
and 1.6% in 1979-97.10
7Most important, world economic growth has slowed significantly. The most authoritative, widely
cited data on global growth rates was compiled in 1995 by Angus Maddison for the Organization
for Economic Cooperation. He reported that while annual real GDP growth in the world economy
averaged 4.9% in the Golden Age years from 1950 to 1973, it slowed to 3.0% in 1973-92. Western
European growth rates fell from 4.7% in the early period to 2.2% in the latter one. Latin
America’s growth averaged 5.3% from 1950-73, but only 2.8% from 1973-92. Africa grew at a
4.4% pace in the first period, but at a 2.8% rate in the second one. Asia, the last bastion of state
led development, was also the only major area not to experience a significant post Golden Age
slowdown, maintaining growth between 5% and 6% for the entire era.11
The same results follow if we focus on the decade of the 1990s. World GDP growth
averaged but 2.5% from 1991-98, after the Neoliberal regime had been firmly established -- by far
the slowest growth rate of the post war era. The growth rate of world real per capital GDP growth
was just as disappointing, averaging only 1.0% per year in the 1990s, less than one third its Golden
Age pace. Most of this growth was in Asia.12 Developed nations had an average GDP growth rate of
only 2% from 1990 through 1998. Latin America growth averaged 3.4% from 1990-98, better than
in the “lost decade” of the 1980s, but much lower than in the Golden Age. Desperate Africa
showed GDP growth of only 2.2% a year from 1990-98. By way of contrast, the state-led economies
of East Asia grew by 6.7% from 1990-97, prior to the outbreak of financial crisis in that region.13
Ironically, it is only the outstanding performance of the state-guided, anti-Neoliberal East
Asian economies that kept developing country growth, inequality, and poverty rates from being
even more disappointing. For example, the proportion of the population living on less than $2 a
day in Asia fell by 39% from 1987 to 1998, but no progress in poverty reduction took place in
Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa in the same period.14
 Economic performance has deteriorated -- on average and for majorities -- virtually
everywhere but in pre-crisis Asia. And even the majority of people in those East Asian countries
most affected by the recent crisis have lived through a significant deterioration in their economic
environment. In 1997 the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development evaluated
global economic performance in the Neoliberal era. Their report drew the following conclusions.
8• Taken as a whole, the world economy is growing too slowly to generate sufficient
employment with adequate pay or to alleviate poverty;
• This has accentuated longstanding tendencies for divergence between developed and
developing companies;
• Capital has gained in comparison with labour;
• There is almost everywhere increased job and income insecurity.15
II. Schumpeterian Versus Neoliberal Micro Theory and the Globalization Debate: The
Importance of Natural Oligopolies
Does Maximum Competition Really Lead to Maximum Efficiency?
We turn to the most abstract level of the Neoliberal argument, focusing on one critical
failure of neoclassical theory as applied to global liberalization that is rarely discussed in the
globalization literature. Many of the most important global markets, in goods and services, are
significantly mis-characterized by the basic assumptions of neoclassical micro theory. For this
reason alone, without regard to the problems of aggregate demand growth and financial instability
already noted, the thesis that maximum liberalization in these markets will lead to the best possible
outcomes is severely flawed.
Global trade and investment are dominated by key industries – such as autos, electronics,
semiconductors, aircraft, consumer durables, shipbuilding, steel, petrochemicals, and banking, for
example – which I will call core industries. They can be realistically characterized in the following
way.
First, they have large economies of scale, both in the production process (at the plant level),
and with respect to the firm as a whole, in advertising and distribution efforts that build and
maintain brand loyalty (consider, for example, the case of US breakfast cereals or laundry
products), in supplier networks, in access to finance, in research and development, and in the
organization of the firm itself.
Second, because of scale economies, the capital investment required to enter these
industries with best practice or minimum cost capability is very large. For example, General
Electric, Ford Motor Company, and IBM have total assets of $304 billion, $275 billion, and $82
9billion respectively.16 Entrance at minimum efficient scale thus creates a non-trivial increase in
industry capacity.
Third, the production process is not subject to the ‘law’ of diminishing returns. The
standard neoclassical assumption of perfect substitution among inputs in the short-run production
function, which underpins the law of diminishing returns, is not empirically accurate: short-run
factor substitutability is in fact quite limited. Thus, marginal cost will either fall, remain constant (a
standard heterodox assumption), or will rise but slowly as output increases, at least until capacity is
reached.
Fourth, the assets of the firm, both physical and organizational, are significantly immobile,
irreversible, or specific. Once in place, they lose substantial value if re-allocated to a different
industry or sold on a second hand market. For example, Ramey and Shapiro, in an NBER study of
the aerospace industry, estimated that “capital that flowed out of the sector sold for only one-third
of its estimated replacement cost” (1998, abstract).
Fifth, agents cannot generate expectations of future economic states that are either
objectively correct, or that they subjectively believe to be complete and correct. The future is
unknowable in principle: we live in a world of fundamental or Keynesian uncertainty.
Consider first the neoclassical assumption that firms are relatively free to enter and exit all
industries. This is the sine qua none of the neoclassical thesis that maximum global liberalization
will create static allocative efficiency in the global economy. Unrestricted exit assures the quick flow
of capital out of industries with below average profit rates, freeing resources to move to above
average profit rate industries. Free exit is thus a condition of existence of efficient asset reallocation
in response to changes in relative prices.
However, when productive assets are substantially irreversible, the neoclassical defense of
allocative efficiency in unregulated markets is dramatically weakened because exit is not free, but
entails a major capital loss for the firm. A firm that moves from an industry with below average
profits to an industry with above average profits will have less capital in the new industry than it
had in the old. Even if the new industry has a significantly higher profit rate, it may well be more
profitable for the firm to stay put.
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But if there is little freedom of exit, it follows logically that there cannot be substantial freedom of
entry, even for newly produced capital. Free entry eventually eliminates the profit rate differential
which enticed it; that is what ensures efficiency. A neoclassical firm with perfectly mobile capital
can enter an industry to take advantage of even a temporary profit rate differential, then exit
without cost when it disappears, to enter some other temporarily profitable industry. This is
sometimes referred to as “hit and run” mobility. However, when capital is irreversible, and
economies of scale prevail, entrance entails substantial risk of major loss. Any firm considering
entry would know that were the profit rate in the new industry to fall below average in the future,
it would not be able to exit except at great capital loss. For firms with high debt to equity ratios,
entry into an industry whose profit rate were to later decline would lead not just to capital loss, but
to possible bankruptcy. Entry into core industries is thus unlikely unless demand growth has been
quite rapid and industry profit rates high for an extended period, the entrant has some
revolutionary innovation, or incumbents have misused their market power and become
extraordinarily inefficient. In normal times, therefore, core industry firms can sustain above
average, oligopoly profits.
Since this argument about exit barriers applies both to existing and new capital, asset
specificity drastically undermines the claim that unregulated markets have either static or dynamic
allocative efficiency. To the extent that core industry firms appear to operate efficiently, and
historical evidence suggests that their performance is at times exemplary, it must be the result of
dynamic efficiencies that do not exist in neoclassical theory.17
Asset irreversibility undermines freedom of entry through a second, independent channel.
A profit maximizing outside firm will only enter an industry if its post entry revenues are expected
to cover the full cost of the capital and organizational assets needed to survive in the industry;
expected price must cover total cost per unit. But a firm already in the industry knows that if it
were to exit, it would lose a substantial part of the value of its physical and organizational assets.
The opportunity cost of the continued use of existing assets is thus measured by the best
alternative return on their use multiplied by their post exit value, which might be, say, one-third
their within industry value. Thus, an incumbent firm will remain in the industry even if, in this
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example, price covers only one-third of its within industry capital costs.
Suppose incumbent firms want to deter entry in order to continue to achieve above average
oligopoly profits. To accomplish this, they can threaten potential entrants with a vicious price war
upon entry. The fact that incumbents can survive for years even if price drops so low that revenues
cover little more than variable cost, whereas a rational outsider would never enter unless price was
expected to cover average total cost, makes their price-war threat credible. The greater the degree of
asset specificity, then, the greater the power of incumbents to deter entry. As Oster puts it: “Heavy
reliance on specific assets encourages firms to stay in an industry even when times are bad, simply
because there is nothing else they can do with these assets” (1999, p.37). Above average profits in
core industries are protected against erosion via entry by asset specificity.
In the neoclassical model of perfect competition, profit maximizing firms always raise
output if price exceeds marginal cost. This increases industry supply, driving output price down. In
equilibrium, therefore, price must equal marginal cost; in the absence of this property, competitive
markets would not exhibit static efficiency. A necessary condition for the coherence of this model
is its assumption of perfect factor substitutability in production. It is this assumption that makes
the ratio of capital to labor fall as the number of workers increases, which in turn causes marginal
cost to rise rapidly as output is increased. Since fixed costs are assumed to be relatively
unimportant, marginal cost will exceed average total cost except at very low output levels. This
property is reflected in the standard cubic total cost functions used in neoclassical textbooks, which
generate quadratic marginal cost functions. The marginal cost pricing associated with perfect
competition is thus consistent with equilibrium in the neoclassical model because in equilibrium
the firm receives (just) enough revenue to cover both its variable cost and the cost of using its
capital assets.
But since core industry firms have significant scale economies, and short run factor
substitution is quite limited, fixed costs will be large, as will fixed costs per unit, and marginal cost
will rise slowly, if at all, with output. A simple total cost function, such as C = k + xQ, where C is
total cost, k is total fixed cost, x is marginal cost (assumed constant and very small relative to k),
and Q is output, incorporates these assumptions. Since marginal cost is x, and total cost per unit is
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(k/Q +x),  marginal cost is everywhere below average total cost in core industries. A recent Wall Street
Journal article noted that “instead of decreasing returns to scale, which the textbooks argue keep
companies from getting too big, the new economy is characterized by increasing returns to scale.”
It cites digital telecommunication firms as examples, noting that they are driven “almost inevitably
to massive scale.” They can “be difficult and costly to build; but once built, they can be expanded
almost at will, since the [marginal] cost of replicating digits is minuscule.”18
Therefore, if, in a core industry, competition were to keep price equal to marginal cost, as
would be the case with maximum or perfect competition, firms could never earn enough money to
recoup their investment in fixed capital. In equilibrium, the average firm would be losing money:
under perfect competition, neither the firm nor the industry could reproduce itself over time. Thus, the
assumptions that core industry fixed costs are large, that marginal costs rise slowly, if at all, and
that most firms earn, on average, enough to reproduce themselves, are logically incompatible with
the assumption of perfect competition. This logic brings us to a conclusion that is central to the
globalization debate. Core industries cannot possibly be organized for long periods of time through perfect
competition. Yet the assumption of perfect competition must be adopted by supporters of global
Neoliberalism who wish to enlist the prestige of neoclassical economic theory – such as it is – on
their side of the debate.
This argument can be stated differently. Assume that liberalization induces aggressive new
firms to enter a profitable core industry, triggering an all out war over market share that threatens
the survival of incumbents. Given large scale economies, entry will cause substantial excess capacity
to develop, putting every firm under intense pressure to cut price in order to spread fixed costs
over greater volume. Even if this price war pushes price well below average total cost, most firms
are unlikely to exit because of the large, assured capital loss exit will bring. Even if the war goes on
for quite a while, firms may rationally refuse to exit. Every firm knows that at some future period,
when enough firms have been forced to exit, the survivors will earn oligopoly enhanced profits
once again. But, given fundamental uncertainty, no firm knows for sure that it will not be among
the survivors. Facing the certainty of large losses if they exit, and a positive but uncertain chance of
above average profits if they survive the struggle, most firms will remain in the fight, prolonging
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industry losses. In the case of core industries then, the maximum competitive intensity sought by
Neoliberal reforms may lead not to efficient resource allocation, but to the dynamic inefficiency
associated with long term excess capacity, low profits or losses, and excessive indebtedness.
To make things worse, there is no guarantee that the most efficient producers will be the
winners. Those most likely to exit are firms that go bankrupt because they relied heavily on debt to
finance asset acquisition. Bankruptcy may help reduce industry excess capacity, though it is quite
possible that the assets of the bankrupt firms will be resold at bargain prices to firms that remain in
production. But, as Keynes argued, reflecting on the situation in the British cotton industry in the
1920s, the correlation between technological or cost inefficiency and indebtedness and
vulnerability to bankruptcy may be weak.19 Inefficient, conservative firms may have the least debt,
while the most efficient firms may be most indebted because they invested aggressively in debt
financed new technologies. Victory may well go to those with the deepest pockets, not to the most
efficient producers, a point to which we return.
Two important conclusions follow from this analysis. First, core industries characterized by
large scale economies and limited short run factor substitutability cannot, for long, be organized
through the intense competition sought by Neoliberals. They are what John Maurice Clark called
“natural oligopolies”: their firms must cooperate sufficiently to maintain industry price far enough
above marginal cost to cover total cost per unit for the average firm. Joseph Schumpeter designated
such interfirm relations, that include both competitive and cooperative dimensions, “corespective
competition.”
Second, since core industries include many of the largest and most important industries in
national economies and in world trade and investment, and serious ‘natural’ barriers to entry and
exit are inherent in their basic structure, the central Neoliberal thesis that maximum liberalization,
creating maximum competitive intensity, will lead to stable and efficient economic outcomes is
fundamentally mistaken. These barriers could not be eliminated by the termination of every form
of government interference with free market competition.  For this reason, there is no legitimate
foundation for the presumption that liberalization will lead, through increased competitive intensity, to the
efficient allocation of new or existing resources around the globe. On the contrary, maximum
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liberalization in core industries is likely to trigger a long period of destructive struggle leading to
the kinds of inferior outcomes seen in the past two decades.
Indeed, globalization has already initiated what is likely to be a long period of restructuring
through mergers, alliances and bankruptcies, that could eventually culminate in re-oligopolization
across national lines, where no political jurisdiction either capable of, or willing to, regulate the
new oligopolists in the public interest currently exists.
A comment on the new Neoliberal Schumpeterians mentioned earlier is in order. US
Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers, a former winner of the prestigious John Bates Clark Award
given bi-annually by the American Economic Association to the most outstanding economist
under the age of forty, recently gave a talk on the “new economy” that represents this position
well.20 He argued that we were moving inexorably toward an “information-based” world in which
the most important industries would “involve large fixed costs and much smaller marginal costs.”
This “new economy is Schumpeterian” because:
the only incentive to produce anything is the possession of temporary monopoly power –
because without that power the price will be bid down to marginal cost and the high initial
fixed cost cannot be recouped. So the constant pursuit of monopoly power becomes the
driving force of the new economy. (2000, p.2)
Given virtually limitless economies of scale, governments should do everything possible to
maximize the size of markets. The “crucial implication for those of us in government is that
policies that help to expand the size of markets in any way become that much more important.” 
Support for maximum deregulation and global integration follow: deregulation “ensures that
government is not preventing or distorting the development of fast growing markets,” and
“support for international trade becomes much more important – because it enables us to take
better advantage of the new economies of scale” (2000, p. 4).
The reader of Summer’s speech might well be astonished at the lack of any empirical
evidence presented in support of these policy conclusions. If economies of scale are “huge” and
rising rapidly, then it is not at all obvious that mere “temporary” monopoly power will provide an
incentive strong enough to induce the investments needed to maintain dynamic efficiency. It
would seem logical to assume that market power over an extended time period would be necessary
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to assure that “the high initial costs [can] be recouped,” otherwise the destructive aspects of
“creative destruction” would dominate its creative aspects  -- especially in an environment when so
much investment is debt financed. But if this is so, would not a world of monopolistic giants
require a powerful new domestic and\or international government agency to regulate them in the
public interest?
Summers is aware that these Schumpeterian assumptions destroy the standard Neoliberal
arguments for global liberalization. They totally alter “what it means to say that a market is
efficient,” he argues, and make traditional neoclassical micro theory useless as a guide to policy
(2000, p. 1). The “right metaphors for the new economy are more Darwinian, with the fittest
surviving, the winner frequently taking all” (2000, p. 2). Summers and others like him thus
cavalierly reject neoclassical micro theory, the most influential and widely used defense of
Neoliberalism, and replace it with nothing more rigorous or ‘scientific’ than a few interesting
assertions about the nature of competition and innovation in the “new economy.”
However flawed neoclassical general equilibrium theory may be, and it is indeed deeply
flawed, replacing it with a few ‘stories’ about Schumpeter’s “gale of creative destruction” as the only
line of defense for Neoliberal globalization seems like a very risky ideological gambit. There is no
widely accepted formal -- or, indeed, informal –  model of an integrated Schumpeterian market
system, no analogue to the Walrasian general equilibrium system taught in every economics
department. There is no well specified model that carefully investigates the systemic effects of a
rolling sequence of massive, largely debt financed, immobile investments in one industry or
technology after another, each of which is quickly devalued by the continuous gale of destruction
Summers envisions? Arguments like those presented by Summers are either derived from formal
models of a single isolated market, or are merely hunches or guesses about how things might
possibly work in a simplistic Schumpeterian system. As such, they have little if any professional
standing, or no claim to the pseudo-scientific status neoclassical economics aspires to. They thus
provide a totally inadequate foundation on which to build support for a radical new global
economic system such as Neoliberalism. The world is being asked to put its economic future at
great risk based on nothing more than the guesses and intuitions of a small group of free market
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devotees.
A Theory of Natural Oligopolies
A useful theory of globalization requires a theory of the behavior of natural oligopolies. The
idea that most important industries do not have the necessary attributes to be efficiently organized
through perfect competition is not new; it can be found in the work of many modern theorists
(such as, for example, Best 1990, Bowring 1986, Chandler 1990, Lazonick 1991, Oster 1999,
Perelman 1999, Porter 1980, and Sylos-Labini 1962). But in the history of economic thought, the
theory of natural oligopoly is most closely identified with the work of Joseph Schumpeter 1976
[1943] and John Maurice Clark 1961. They argue that the conditions required for perfect
competition exist only in a small number of industries, the great majority of which are not of
major importance to national or global economic performance.21 As Schumpeter put it:
perfect competition is the exception and ... even if it were the rule there would be much
less reason for congratulations than one might think. If we look more closely at the
conditions ... that must be fulfilled in order to produce perfect competition, we realize
immediately that outside of agricultural mass production there cannot be many instances
of it. (1976 [1943], pp. 78-79).
As noted, fixed cost per unit will be dangerously high in core industries unless firms can
operate near optimal rates of capacity utilization, where the excess of marginal cost over average
total cost is smallest. The reproduction of the industry over time thus requires enough cooperation
among incumbents to maintain price above average total cost and keep excess capacity from
becoming too large. Fortunately, the economies of scale associated with these industries and the
substantial immobility of their assets constitute entry barriers that limit the number of firms who
can achieve minimum efficient scale. Thus, they simultaneously create the need for, and the
conditions required for, cooperation among leading firms. The smaller the number of firms, the
easier it is to establish coordination agreements and prevent defection from them.
“Corespective” rather than perfect or cutthroat competition is required in natural
oligopolies for at least four reasons. First, price wars must be avoided. It is imperative that price be
held significantly above marginal cost, especially in times of sluggish demand and high excess
capacity, when the incentive for firms to cut price and increase production to reduce fixed cost per
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unit is at its highest. Consider that the industry price wars that took place in the last decades of the
nineteenth century in the US, when rising economies of scale and rapid technical change were
causing dramatic declines in total cost per unit at optimal operating rates, led to such widespread
losses and bankruptcies that they ushered in a merger and consolidation wave, which culminated
in the rise of the Great Trusts of the era.
Second, high trend excess capacity must be avoided. The industry must establish some
method of investment coordination that can prevent supply from running too far ahead of
demand. Excess capacity lowers the industry profit rate. Moreover, if one firm builds capacity
much faster than industry demand is growing, that firm will be in a position to initiate a price war,
because it will have the capacity to accommodate large customer defections from the other firms.
The restriction of excess capacity to the amount needed to accommodate expected future demand
and provide a cushion against uncertainty creates an environment conducive to cooperation
because it guarantees that no competitor can significantly profit from severe price cutting. The very
act of building disproportionate capacity is therefore likely to destroy interfirm cooperation
because it will induce other firms to over-invest in self-defense, in preparation for a price war.
Excessive investment or over-investment in a natural oligopoly can result from defensive acts, not
just from aggression or firm optimism about future demand and profit growth, a point further
explored in section III, where ‘coerced’ investment is analyzed.
Third, corespective competition may be a necessary, though not a sufficient, condition for
the adoption and maintenance of partly cooperative or ‘high road’ enterprise-labor relations. High
road labor relations were adopted by most of the successful global core industry firms in the post
World War II era. To be able to initiate and react efficiently to innovations and to environmental
change of all types, and to achieve a high degree of production efficiency, firms need a loyal,
experienced and flexible labor force, one that has maximum firm specific skills. To attract and
maintain such a workforce, firms may have to offer workers benefits such as job security, wages that
rise with experience, decent treatment on the job, acceptance of unions, and a fair share of the
company’s productivity gains. It is especially likely to offer these benefits in economies where
unions are strong, unemployment is low, and the government supports the labor movement.
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Destructive competition, on the other hand, eliminates firms’ ability to maintain the high road
because it perpetually undercuts their profits, forcing them, as a condition of short term survival,
to minimize cost at each point in time. Short term cost minimization requires wage cuts,
replacement of high with low wage workers, work speedup, reneging on implicit contracts, as well
as layoffs whenever demand fails to grow as fast as productivity. Maximum competition thus forces
firms to adopt low road labor relations; corespective competition does not.
Fourth, and most important, corespective competition in natural oligopolies is necessary to achieve
fast paced capital accumulation and rapid innovation, the forces that create high long-term productivity
growth. It is difficult to induce long lived investment and innovation in the unprofitable and
uncertain environment that destructive competition generates. Cooperation is conducive to
investment and innovation because it raises the industry profit rate and prevents profits created
through investment or innovation from being eroded by excessive competition. It also lowers the
uncertainty associated with the expected return on investment.22 Note that in periods with fast
paced capital accumulation, rapid innovation, and rising productivity, sustained industry demand
growth is a necessary condition for cooperative behavior because without it, the industry cannot
avoid rising excess capacity, which leads to price wars.
Natural oligopoly theorists such as Schumpeter and Clark emphasize that the impressive
long run historical record of rapid economic growth, rising output per worker, and rising per
capita income in the advanced capitalist countries, had little to do with the alleged static efficiency
properties of free, competitive markets. Rather, they insist along with Marx that the great
accomplishments of capitalism result from the combined effects of capital accumulation (including
the buildup of human capital) and innovation, which includes, but is not limited to, technical
change. In the twentieth century, private capital accumulation has been concentrated in natural
oligopolies, which have also been the site of the implementation, if not always the invention, of the
most productive economic innovations. Innovations create new products, improved production
technology, more effective organization of the enterprise (for example, the creation of the multi-
division firm made it possible to efficiently administer ever larger enterprises), new sources of
material supplies, growing product markets that are required to take advantage of economies of
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scale, and new sources of finance. It is the dynamic efficiency largely associated with natural
oligopolies, not static efficiency, that matters in the long run.23
There are good reasons why so much capital investment and such a disproportionate share
of innovation has taken place in natural oligopolies. Huge capital investments in long lived,
immobile assets of the kind needed to compete in natural oligopolies put the owners of the firm at
risk of great potential loss. And major innovations often require years of trial and error, large
investments in R&D and in engineering talent, numerous false starts, and many mistakes in
implementation, even after the right general path has been identified. Yet though the costs of
innovation are often great, the possible sources of failure are almost too numerous to list. The
potential entrant faces the possibility that the industry will decline, or that a price war with more
established incumbents, who may have deeper pockets, will erupt. The inside innovator faces the
possibility that the industry will decline, or that the innovation will fail, or that some other
innovator will implement the innovation first, or, perhaps worst of all, that the innovation will be
quickly and inexpensively copied by competitors should it prove to be successful.
Given such risk, the question arises as to why any firm is willing to enter industries with
large economies of scale, or why any firm seriously contemplates shouldering the large, certain
costs of a major innovation when the benefits are so uncertain. What provides the necessary
incentives and what keeps perceived risk down to manageable levels?
The theory of perfectly competitive markets is not helpful here, because it cannot deal with
significant scale economies and denies the existence of fundamental uncertainty. Indeed, given its
assumptions, it would be irrational for any neoclassical firm to ever undertake a costly search for a
major innovation. If capital is perfectly mobile, entrance free, and all economic knowledge freely
available to everyone, there is no incentive to engage in costly innovation. The knowledge
associated with any innovation is assumed to be immediately and freely available to all, so no
competitive advantage accrues to the innovator. If the innovation reduces unit costs, perfect
competition guarantees that price will quickly fall, eliminating the above average profits innovation
brings. Industrial organizational theory acknowledges this fundamental flaw in the theory of
perfect competition, and deals with it by recognizing the need for patents, and tax incentives for
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R&D spending. Patents, which have seventeen year lives in the US, give firms monopoly rights to
the super profits that accrue to innovation, solving the incentive problem nicely, though
preventing the benefits of innovation from being shared with consumers for almost two decades.
However, many important innovations have not had patent protection, and many firms and
industries have managed to maintain above average profits even after the patents that created them
ran out. How is this to be explained?
The theory of corespective competition in natural oligopolies stresses the fact that large,
risky investments will not be undertaken unless the organization of the industry offers both high
rewards and insurance against excessive risk and uncertainty to the successful investor.
Corespective behavior provides the key insurance policy; as long as it prevails, destructive
competition will not trigger the excess capacity associated with an investment war, or lower price by
enough to eliminate above average profits, or generate excessive uncertainty. Barriers to entry make
it possible for such industries to maintain above average profit rates for decades, providing the
incentive needed to induce costly and risky innovation. Industry competitors will of course try to
copy and improve on the initial innovation, but once we acknowledge that information is
asymmetric and often tacit, and very costly and time consuming to acquire even where acquisition
is possible, the profits created by an innovation are likely to accrue to its initiator for a long time.
Schumpeter also called attention to the fact that significant innovations often come in
cumulative bursts, rather than in a single once-and-for-all change. One firm changes a product or
process, another finds a way to improve on it, and so on. It often takes experience and learning by
doing to establish the innovation’s final form. This phenomenon, which “profoundly affects” the
efficiency with which firms respond to technical change, is “invariably overlooked.” To be
dynamically efficient and avoid the premature obsolescence of its capital stock, a core industry
must allow firms either to extend the time between the introduction of new techniques, or to skip
over some stages of a cumulative innovation process.
This is what might be called ex ante conservation of capital in expectation of further
improvements. Frequently, if not in most cases, a going concern does not simply face the
question whether or not to adopt a definite new method of production that is the best
thing out and, in the form immediately available, can be expected to retain that position
for some length of time. A new type of machine is in general but a link in a chain of
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improvements and may presently become obsolete. In a case like this it would obviously
not be rational to follow the chain link by link regardless of the capital loss to be suffered
each time. (1976 [1943], p.98)
Destructive or perfect competition makes firms “follow the chain link by link,” creating a
coordination failure that is, as Schumpeter stresses, irrational for the industry. Each firm has to
invest in every possible phase of the innovation process because if it skips a link that its
competitors acquire, it will lose customers and endure rising excess capacity because its products
are inferior to, or its variable costs higher than, those of other firms. Under destructive
competition, a wave of innovative activity could leave in its wake a mass of obsolete, devalued
capital. If these investments are large and entail substantial debt financing, the industry could
develop severe financial fragility. In contrast, corespective behavior allows dominant firms to
coordinate investment -- to manage the pace of implementation of innovation, permitting
maximum industry gains from the process. One vintage of capital may be kept in place long
enough to generate revenues that cover its cost before the next vintage of capital is adopted, or one
stage of a multi-stage process of capital embodied technical change may be skipped altogether.
Firms can wait for the next, superior vintage before investing. In this way, the destructive
dimension of Schumpeter’s “gale of creative destruction” can be minimized without sacrificing its
creative dimension.
Having examined various reasons why cooperation is essential in natural oligopolies, and
why natural oligopolies are an essential part of the development process, it is necessary to address
the balance between cooperation and competition that must be maintained in these industries if
they are to remain viable and be dynamically efficient. When corespective relations are stable,
competition that puts industry growth and profitability in jeopardy tends to be avoided. This helps
prevent excessive price competition and capacity expanding investment wars. However, the struggle
across other dimensions of competition may be quite intense. Firms may fight within broad limits
over market share through advertising, and by developing more effective marketing and
distribution systems. Product differentiation and the development of brand loyalty is an ongoing
process.
By far the most important forms of competition over the long run involve new products,
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improved technology, and organizational change. Depending on the industry, large resources may
be invested in R&D, either to be able to initiate innovation (offensive competition) or to be able to
respond quickly if some other firm introduces an important product or process innovation
(defensive competition). There is a strong incentive to cut costs over time, because it is the low cost firms
that have the strongest exit options should corespective behavior break down. Indeed, if one firm develops a
large enough cost advantage over its competitors and has created substantial excess capacity, it is in
position to initiate a war to reorder relations of domination in the industry. All important firms
therefore, if only in self defense, must try to keep pace with the industry’s low cost producer. The
kind of competition that is crucial for dynamic efficiency, Schumpeter insists, is not the price
competition focused on in neoclassical theory. 
In capitalist reality as distinguished from its textbook picture, it is not [price] competition
which counts but the competition from the new commodity, the new technology, the new
source of supply, the new type of organization (the largest scale unit of control, for
instance) – competition which commands a decisive cost or quality advantage and which
strikes not at the margin of the profits and outputs of the existing firms but at their
foundations and their very lives. This kind of competition is as much more effective than
the other as a bombardment is in comparison with forcing a door, and so much more
important that it becomes a matter of comparative indifference whether competition in the
ordinary [static] sense functions more or less promptly; the powerful lever that in the long
run expands output and brings down prices is made of other stuff. (1976 [1943], pp. 84-85)
  
The last point emphasized by Schumpeter, on the source of long term price decline, is
extremely important. Dominant firms in natural oligopolies cannot set price as high as they please.
Though large barriers to entry give them a good deal of pricing leeway, they cannot let price or
profit rates get so high that they entice outsiders to the industry. It is entry prevention pricing
combined with competitive pressure to lower cost which induces firms in natural oligopolies to
eventually share the benefits of long term productivity improvements with consumers in the form
of lower prices.24  
It should be noted that corespective relations among dominant firms in natural oligopolies
do not last forever, though history does provide examples in which they have lasted for a very long
time. They are subject, one might say, to the law of uneven development. An initial distribution of
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relative power among firms, leading to a particular mode of domination and cooperation, is likely
to change over time, possibly triggering an outbreak of war within the industry. If the barriers to
entry are initially large enough, cooperation may become too cozy and competition too weak,
eventually creating a large gap between the best available technology and current industry practice,
and between the potential and actual efficiency of incumbent firms. These gaps are likely to induce
a successful invasion of the industry by more technologically and/or more financially powerful
domestic or foreign firms. The collapse of the global dominance of “Big Steel” in the US after the
1960s is just one example of this phenomenon.
The policy lesson to be drawn from this discussion is that society cannot depend solely on
markets to ensure that powerful groups of corporations will operate in a manner consistent with
the interests of the majority of the population -- no matter what form of competitive relations
prevails in core industries. The argument that “perfect” competition will destroy core industries
does not imply that corespective competition assures socially efficient performance. It is imperative
that the competitive environment be effectively regulated by government bodies that are both
competent and politically insulated from the corporations they oversee.
The implications of this analysis of core industries for the debate on globalization are self
evident. The acceleration of liberalization across the globe in the past two decades strongly eroded
the conditions necessary for the maintenance of corespective behavior in many of the world’s most
important industries, as state imposed barriers to entry fell almost everywhere, financial capital
began to move rapidly back and forth across national borders, and technological change made it
easier to shift real capital around the world and locate virtually any corporate function any where
without loss of efficiency. This raised the intensity of competition in most of the globe’s core
industries. Of course, there were benefits associated with these changes. Important new,
technologically advanced industries emerged. Some inefficient firms were forced to improve or die;
the creative destruction of intense competition is needed from time to time to eliminate the least
efficient producers and destroy outdated capital. Some firms from the developing world were also
able to gain greater access to financial capital, and create needed economies of scale by moving into
newly opened Northern markets.
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But it must be remembered that natural oligopolies cannot reproduce themselves over long
periods under excessive competitive intensity. At some point, theory tells us, the competitive wars
raging across global industries will begin to create winners and losers, the forces of consolidation
will overwhelm the forces of competition, and industries will begin to re-oligopolize. We have
already seen this process emerge in many industries in the great merger and acquisition boom of
the 1990s.
Karl Marx developed perhaps the most important single insight into the relation between
competition and cooperation in the history of economic thought. He believed that neither pole of
this relation ever gained permanent domination over the other; rather, their relation changed
dialectically across time. In the following quotation, the term monopoly should be broadly
interpreted as cooperative interfirm relations. 
In practical life we find not only competition, monopoly and the antagonism between
them, but also the synthesis of the two, which is not a formula, but a movement. Monopoly
produces competition, competition produces monopoly. Monopolists are made from
competition; competitors become monopolists. ... and the more the mass of the
proletarians grows as against the monopolists of one nation, the more desperate
competition becomes between monopolists of different nations. The synthesis is of such a
character that monopoly can only maintain itself by continually entering into the struggle
of competition. (1963, p. 152, emphasis added)
At the present moment, the drive to re-oligopolize in core industries grows ever more intense even
as the winds of destructive competitive continue to howl across the globe.
III. Structural Contradictions of Global Neoliberalism: From the Virtuous Circle of the Golden
Age to the Vicious Circle of the Neoliberal Era
Say’s Law has no relevance to the real world, and the neoclassical theory of perfectly
competitive markets cannot explain, even to a first approximation, the dynamics of important
global industries. Integrating insights from Keynesian and Marxian macro theory with
Schumpeterian and Marxian perspectives on competition leads to the conclusion that long term,
widely shared prosperity cannot be achieved by unregulated markets. Rather, it requires the
creation of an effective, historically contingent, complex, interrelated set of government and
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private institutions and practices. This section stresses the complexity and inter-connectedness of
such arrangements. In the Golden Age, governments could act effectively only because of the
healthy condition of the private economy, and the private sector could grow rapidly only because
of effective government economic policy. Global Neoliberalism has destroyed the conditions
required for a productive, symbiotic relationship between state and market, and between micro
and macro economic activity.  
To achieve sustained economic good times, governments must regulate industrial and
financial markets, see to it that aggregate demand grows fast enough to maintain high employment,
keep excess capacity low, and secure the conditions needed for corespective relations among core
industry firms, and to take whatever actions are required to counter the market’s natural tendency
toward inequality and instability. If the state performs these tasks adequately, markets may
function reasonably well for a time. But ongoing market processes eventually undermine the initial
conditions that enabled them to function successfully. Any set of government institutions and
policies adequate to generate egalitarian growth in one period, will become to some degree
obsolete and ineffective as conditions in the market economy evolve over time. The challenge to
design institutions capable of exercising adequate social control over markets, though not
necessarily the political power needed to do so, is thus presented anew to each generation.
Consider the conditions that generated the Golden Age. First and foremost, class power
relations were such that a growth-with-equity policy regime was politically feasible. The ‘social
contracts’ of the era committed most interest groups to at least passive support of progressive
national economic policy objectives. Elites went along in part because strong capital controls and
low levels of trade and investment flows after the war left them without an effective run-away
option. In the absence of cross border mobility, industrial firms and rentiers could not credibly
threaten to undermine government economic policies they did not like. Their fates were thus tied
to the health of their national markets; to grow and remain profitable, industrial and financial
capital needed a prosperous domestic economy with high employment and rapidly rising mass
consumption. Given these conditions, and the general fear of the political consequences of a
return to depression, governments around the developed world accepted responsibility for
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regulating aggregate demand growth, and used macro policy to pursue growth and high
employment. Under the political conditions of the time, Western governments, with varying
degrees of enthusiasm, lent their support to unions, passed worker friendly collective bargaining
laws, regulated business, tightly controlled financial markets, and built social welfare systems that
gave workers reasonable exit options in their negotiations with employers and held poverty and
inequality in check. These laws and regulations, in concert with strong union movements,
sustained low unemployment and high road management-labor relations in many core industries,
helped maintain a better power balance between capital and labor in both the political and
economic spheres than had previously been the case. An important lesson from the Golden Age
experience is that state guided growth functions most effectively when: (1) the interests of the
majority of the population strongly influence the political process; and (2) the institution and
policy structure is such that government has the power needed to effectively regulate business
behavior.
Core industries played an influential role in Golden Age developments. Natural oligopolies
across the North -- in autos, steel, rubber, aluminum, consumer durables, and so forth – had a
disproportionate share of physical capital, profit and investment spending, did most private sector
research and development, and generated the highest productivity gains. Consistent with John
Kenneth Galbraith’s theory of counter-veiling power, they also were the industries with the largest
and most militant unions; this facilitated a relatively equitable sharing of oligopoly ‘rents’ through
productivity based real wage increases.25 These industries were dominated by a small number of
firms -- such as the “big three” in US autos and steel, which made interfirm cooperation feasible.
An analogous situation prevailed in East Asia and in high growth Latin American countries where
large firms in key industries thrived in part because they were protected from the most destructive
aspects of competition.
Thus, conditions necessary for corespective interfirm relations were present in the Golden
Age. Aggregate demand was rising rapidly, so firms could reasonably expect their industry to
achieve sustained growth. This meant that capacity utilization could remain high even in the face
of rapid investment and innovation, a necessary condition for cooperative interfirm relations.
27
Corespective relations in turn kept average profit rates high and contained instability and
uncertainty, providing the incentives needed to induce long lived investment and innovation. In
this environment of contained uncertainty and assured high profits, firms in core oligopolies could
engage in long-term planning, generously fund R&D, offer lifetime employment to most workers
(thereby making labor a quasi-fixed firm asset), and manage the introduction of new technologies
to ensure that capital equipment did not become obsolete before its pay-back period was over.
Long term horizons also permitted the development of efficient supplier networks, and made the
provision of ‘patient’ capital possible. Moreover, profits were high enough to finance most
investment internally and, since real interest rates were low, indebtedness was held within safe
bounds.
 Most important, long term planning horizons made it possible for firms to choose high
road labor relations. If firms can credibly offer workers benefits such as long-term job security,
reasonable pensions, a fair share of productivity gains, and wages that rise with seniority, workers
are likely to offer firms loyalty, flexibility, honest effort, and investment in firm specific skills in
return. This is the productivity enhancing “implicit contract” that most industrial relations experts
were so enamored with, at least until recently. High road relations are usually associated with the
Japanese firms that dominated world trade in the 1980s, but they were also used by successful
German firms and core US industrial firms in the Golden Age. Some aspects of high road
relations are also found in successful, non-Japanese East Asian firms, though at times accompanied
by brutal suppression of labor rights. Casual empirical observation strongly suggests that
throughout the post World War II era, the most successful firms in the world relied on high road
labor relations. Acceptance of high road labor policies did not prove that top corporate managers
were progressive, union loving people. It suggested only that given the conditions of the time,
which included low unemployment, strong unions and labor friendly governments, high road
labor relations were either understood to be an effective means to achieve key firm goals, or that, at
a minimum, serious labor conflict was seen as too costly to provoke. Of course, from time to time,
the strength and resolve of unions were tested by management.
However, though high road labor relations are efficient and productive in the long run,
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they cannot survive slow demand growth and the cutthroat competition, high excess capacity and
low or negative profit rates it brings. Under such conditions, with prices pushed well below average
total cost, the survival of the firm is called into question, drastically shortening planning horizons.
Long term policies become a luxury which firms cannot afford. They are inefficient in the short
run either because, in the case of R&D and capacity expanding capital investment, they require a
large commitment of scarce internal or borrowed funds well in advance of expected returns, or
because, in the case of high road labor policies, they fail to take advantage of the short term cost
reductions associated with layoffs, labor speed-up, and wage and benefit cuts. Chances of short
term survival under duress are maximized by aggressive cost cutting of all kinds. And, to state the
obvious, interfirm cooperation is impossible when all firms are in a life and death struggle for
survival.
High road labor relations thus require corespective competition, which in turn requires
adequate demand growth. To close the virtuous circle, we observe that sustained growth is not
possible even if governments are committed to it, without corespective competition and high road
labor relations in the core of the economy. In the Golden Age, core firms were able to invest at an
impressive rate and achieve a remarkable record of technological improvement. This produced the
high productivity rates of the era, which raised potential aggregate supply. Fast paced investment
spending plus real wage gains in line with productivity growth in the core, which kept upward
pressure on wages in more competitive sectors, helped keep private sector aggregate demand
growth in line with aggregate supply. Conditions in the private sector thus made it easier for governments
to perform their required tasks. They could use Keynesian macro policy and the social welfare system
to support growth, moderate instability and inequality, augment private sector demand where
necessary, regulate business in the public interest, and maintain private sector confidence that the
whole process could be sustained over time.
The demise of the Golden Age is an oft told tale -- though not everybody has the story
right.26 By the tempestuous 1970s, reflecting the law of uneven development, several decades of
growth and change had reduced the effectiveness of the Golden Age matrix of public and private
institutions and policies. This forced Northern elites and electorates to consider a change of
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economic regimes. They could have chosen either to reform the existing system of government
managed growth so it could achieve its traditional objectives in the new environment, or,
alternatively, they could have changed course, letting lightly regulated global markets determine the
broad outlines of the economic future. The process through which this choice was made is
examined in Crotty 2000. For current purposes it is sufficient to note that powerful economic
elites, especially in the US, in pursuit of their own self interest rather than the public good, chose
the market dominated option. Global Neoliberalism was the result. It has by now created a new
and destructive dynamic inter-relation among public and private sector institutions and policies,
turning the virtuous circle of prosperity into a vicious circle of slow growth, destructive
competition and low road labor relations. And it has undermined state led development strategies
in the South.   
Sources of Slow Growth in the Global Neoliberal Regime
This section briefly discusses six related forces, deeply rooted in Neoliberalism, that have
pushed global aggregate demand growth well below its Golden Age level in the past two decades.
We argue that the slowdown in demand growth is a crucial component of the complex forces that
have caused a deterioration in economic performance in the Neoliberal era.
However, this does not imply that strong global growth rates would be necessary for a
healthy global economy under all possible institutional frameworks. For example, there are
economic reforms which would make the achievement of full employment in the developed world
possible at lower rates of growth than are presently required for this purpose. And environmental
problems may force governments in the intermediate future to seriously redesign modes of
economic growth. Our argument is that rapid demand growth is required for global prosperity
under existing institutions and policies.
 The most important constraint on global demand is the slow growth of wages and mass
consumption brought on by global Neoliberalism. Wages have been restrained by high average
unemployment, the decline of unions, weaker government support for collective bargaining, and a
worldwide slowdown in productivity growth. More intense international competition has destroyed
corespective inter-firm relations in most industries, causing firms to shift from high- to low-road
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labor relations. Fear of job loss has risen dramatically due to rising import competition, the
increased mobility of physical capital, the 1990s merger and acquisition explosion (brought on in
large part by the onset of destructive competition), and chronic job “churning” (associated with
labor-saving technical change and new corporate strategies of downsizing and re-engineering).27 By
weakening labor’s bargaining power, job insecurity has lowered both real wage and household
income growth. One study of 19 developed countries (not including the US) found that after rising
rapidly through the early 1970s, real compensation growth fell to 1.2% a year in 1979-89 and again
to 0.7% in 1989-96.28 Moreover, increased global openness and improvements in technology have
made it easier for multinational corporations to substitute low-wage Southern labor for higher-paid
Northern labor -- which may contribute to lower global wage inequality, but reduces global labor
income nonetheless.29 Finally, growth in workers’ disposable income has been retarded by a shift in
the tax burden from mobile capital to immobile labor, rising household debt burdens, and,
recently, a shrinking social safety net.30
Second,  the evolution of the global financial system has depressed global growth. High real
interest rates were imposed after 1980 by independent, conservative, and inflation-obsessed central
banks. The natural predilection of independent Central Banks for high real interest rates was
reinforced by the spread of financial deregulation in the 1980s and 1990s, which increased the
power of global financial interests. Rentiers were increasingly able to use capital flight to punish
countries that used macro policy to pursue growth and employment rather than low inflation.
Moreover, the heightened instability of global financial markets has significantly increased the
incidence of banking and currency crises, which induce serious recessions in the areas in which
they occur, and lead financial investors to demand larger risk premiums on loans.
Third, the pace and the character of global investment restrain growth. The growth of
investment spending has slowed in the Neoliberal era due not only to high real interest rates, but
to sluggish aggregate-demand growth as well. Slow demand growth retards investment, which in
turn further slows demand growth in an ongoing multiplier-accelerator process. Investment has
also been restrained by low profit rates in most industries most of the time, and by excess capacity.
The breakdown of corespective relations has also reduced investment by increasing uncertainty.
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But beyond this, much investment in recent years has been labor-saving and labor-disempowering,
undertaken in response to destructive competition and in support of a shift from high road to anti-
worker labor policies. Thus, the increased aggregate demand it created has been counteracted to
some degree by the job and wage losses associated with it.
Fourth, fiscal policy has become increasingly restrictive. Large cuts in the social safety net
and an abhorrence of fiscal deficits are part of the Neoliberal revolution. The importance given to
austere fiscal policy was recognized explicitly in the criteria established under the Maestricht Treaty
and carried over to the Euro zone. Government social spending in Europe and North America is
still large; it represents a higher share of national income than even a decade ago. But there is no
question that after rising significantly in response to slow growth and high unemployment rates in
the 1980s, government spending as a share of income has peaked, and in many countries begun to
decline, as conservative political forces become ever more powerful. For example, the structural
budget deficit as a percent of GDP for the advanced countries exhibited a continuous fall from
3.9% in 1992 to 0.5% in 1999, and it is expected to continue to decline.31 A drop in aggregate
demand equal to 3.4% of GDP is a huge drag on economic growth.
Fifth, the expanding role of international institutions such as the IMF and World Bank has
slowed global growth. As more developing countries experienced national insolvency over the past
two decades, the Fund and the Bank have stepped in with ever larger loans -- the loan package put
together for Korea in 1997-98 was on the order of $58 billion. But they have invariably mandated
austerity macroeconomic policies plus Neoliberal restructuring in return for their money. The
growth of Fund-Bank mandated austerity-plus-restructuring programs around the developing world
has severely constrained global aggregate demand. It has been estimated that something like 40%
of the world’s population living in 55 countries is under IMF dictate.
Finally, the 1990s witnessed a severe weakening of East Asian type models of state-guided
development. Battered by increased liberalization of trade, investment, and, especially, financial
capital flows, by threats from the G7 nations, the IMF, the World Bank, the WTO, and
multinational firms and banks, and by ever stronger demands from domestic elites for freedom
from government control, the traditional structures of state economic regulation across Asia are
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weakening. Korea and Japan are two examples of this dynamic process. Under its indigenous
development models, East and Southeast Asia was the only high growth area in the world in the
Neoliberal era. Business Week reported that “Of 119 countries studied by the World Bank over
these decades [from the mid-1960s through the mid-1990s], seven achieved both high growth and
low income inequality. All seven were in Asia.”32 About half of the growth in global GDP from
1989 through 1997 originated in East Asia. If Neoliberalism were to permanently replace state-
guided growth in East Asia, lower average global growth rates could be expected to follow.
Closing the Vicious Circle: Slow Growth Triggers Destructive Competition, Which Further Lowers
Growth 
According to the business press, chronic excess capacity in many global industries is a fact
of life in the Neoliberal era. Business Week noted that: “supply outpaces demand everywhere,
sending prices lower, eroding corporate profits and increasing layoffs.”33 GE Chairman Jack Welch
claimed that “there is excess capacity in almost every industry.”34 The Wall Street Journal observed
that “from cashmere to blue jeans, silver jewelry to aluminum cans, the world is in oversupply”.35
The Economist worries about “a malign deflation caused by excess capacity and weak demand,”
speculating that the gap between sales and capacity is “at its widest since the 1930s.”36
This widespread growth in excess global capacity raises a puzzling question. Why hasn’t
global supply growth adapted to the reduced pace of global demand growth in the past two
decades, creating sluggish but balanced growth? A theory of natural oligopoly suggests an
interesting answer. By reducing the trend rate of aggregate demand growth, Neoliberal policies created an
initial problem of excess supply in most core industries. This destroyed the conditions necessary for corespective
competition. An outbreak of destructive competitive processes then caused over-investment in many global
manufacturing and service industries, which continuously reproduced excess capacity.
In the Neoliberal era, rapid technical change, increasingly open borders, and the end of
governments’ commitment to high growth and strong unions destroyed the conditions necessary
for corespective behavior. We have witnessed an outbreak of what I have called “coercive
competition” (Crotty 1993) in manufacturing and elsewhere, based on cut-throat pricing, the
destruction of secure oligopoly rents, over-investment relative to demand, (leading to chronic
33
excess capacity), and faced-paced technical innovation that often renders recently constructed
capital goods prematurely obsolete -- and the debt that financed them unpayable.37 Note that this
over investment is limited to globally contested core industries. Since there has been a pronounced
decline in the rate of increase of all other forms of fixed capital investment, including government
investment, and since even in core industries investment undertaken solely to expand capacity has
dried up, there is no logical inconsistency between the fact, noted above, that the growth rate of
global fixed capital formation has declined, and the argument that coerced investment in key
global industries had increased.
With their survival threatened by fierce competition, much of it international in character,
large firms in the industrialized North were forced to adopt shorter planning horizons. Semi-
cooperative management-labor relations were now considered unviable. Firms believed they had to
slash labor costs through downsizing and wage cuts to survive beyond the short-run. Conflict-
driven labor relations policies became the order of the day.38 Coercive competition quickly altered
the strategies of US and British firms, which had the weakest institutional, legal, and cultural
commitment to the high road. They were the first to attack their unions, repudiate existing
‘implicit contracts’ with workers and suppliers, maximize outsourcing and the use of temporary
workers, and adopt downsizing as a permanent policy. But coercive competition is inexorably
deconstructing the traditional practices of European and even East Asian firms as well. Ironically,
the new Anglo-American firm is at its strongest under conditions of instability and adversity, and
relatively weakest in stable, prosperous eras, because its emphasis on flexibility shifts the costs of
adversity and instability from the firm and its shareholders to workers and governments.
But how does coercive competition lead to chronic excess capacity in globally contested
core markets?39 Under corespective competition and adequate demand growth, core industries are
highly profitable. Therefore, large multinational corporations from mature industrialized
economies, anticipating high future profits and acknowledging the massive cost of exit,  want to
continue to dominate them. However, as the post-war period evolved, developing countries that
desired to move up the technology/productivity/value-added ladder, such as Japan, Korea and
Taiwan, entered many of these industries. Each new wave of entrants, like the countries of South
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East Asia in recent decades, added to the potential for market overcrowding, making inter-firm
cooperative relations increasingly difficult to maintain. Had global aggregate demand growth
remained strong, the newcomers would have been easier to accommodate, and the breakdown of
corespective relations might have been postponed. In the Golden Age, fast growth and limited
international competition allowed Northern oligopolies to maintain some degree of corespective
relations even as Japan and, later, Korea and Taiwan began their slow ascent up the export pecking
order. But, as we have seen, Neoliberalism severely constrained global demand growth. With
sluggish demand, established players must quickly exit from the industry as new firms enter to
avoid chronic excess supply, falling prices and low average profits. This obviously did not happen.
This raises another key question. Why do new entrants keep coming and why don’t
established firms withdraw from these markets as profits deteriorate? Emerging countries have to pass
through most of the rungs on the technology ladder if they are to achieve economic development; they cannot
go directly from labor intensive textile exports to auto and semiconductor exports. That is, they
must either invest in core industries or give up any hope of becoming a developed nation. But
established firms have reason not to exit; they have huge sunk physical, human and organizational
costs which will largely be destroyed if they are forced to pull out of the industry. Fundamental or
Keynesian uncertainty plays a big role in this process. If it were known in advance which firms
would ultimately lose the struggle for survival, the losers would exit early to cut their losses. And
those who are demonstrably weaker than their opponents often do leave, or are taken over by
financially stronger firms. But given the importance of many of these markets and the huge sunk
costs required to enter and thrive in them, most competitors try to ‘stay in the game’ even as
competition mounts, hoping to survive the current struggle so they can reap the secure, above
average profits expected to emerge when the eventual winners are in a position to re-oligopolize the
industry.
The key to understanding the continued reproduction of excess capacity in core global
industries is this: firms that decide to stay in the game must continue to invest in the face of these seemingly
disastrous industry conditions -- and largely because of, not in spite of, these problems. In Crotty 1993,
an article that focused on the complex role of competition in Marxian investment theory, I labeled
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this phenomena “coerced investment.” The deliberate creation of excess capacity as a weapon in
competitive wars was discussed above. Price cutting cannot generate greater sales volume to lower
fixed cost per unit if the company cutting price has no extra production capacity. More important,
price-profit pressures force firms that have decided to ‘stay in the game’ to invest to raise product
quality and lower costs of all kinds, including labor costs, administrative costs, the cost of sales and
distribution, intra-firm communication and control costs, transportation costs, and the cost of
supplies. And Neoliberalism has invited firms to locate cost cutting investment any place in the
world that looks best suited for the job.
Firms must invest to take advantage of the ever larger returns to scale made possible by
technical change. And the shift from high to low road labor relations requires a reconstitution of
the labor process: investment is thus needed to shed labor through downsizing and re-engineering,
and to increase direct monitoring and control of labor, because the implicit contracts and worker
loyalty that previously helped elicit energetic labor effort have been destroyed. Firms must invest to
acquire best practice technology for both cost reduction and quality reasons; in core markets such
as autos, semiconductors and airplanes, the acquisition of best-practice technology often requires
huge capital investments of ever increasing size. Finally, they must invest to get inside the borders
and on the ground floor of expected high growth developing markets, a designation that now
rapidly shifts back and forth across geographical boundaries. Of course, plant closings take place
along side coerced investment, but their impact is too weak to eliminate industry excess capacity.
With profits and cash flow at low levels, a high percentage of this investment will be debt financed.
Many of these coerced investments appear at first glance to be irrational and, for this
reason, they cannot exist in Neoclassical theory. From the perspective of the economy or society as
a whole, they are irrational. But Neoliberalism has created massive coordination failures that make
it individually rational for firms to behave in ways that are collectively destructive. All but the
weakest firms hope to survive the competitive wars. As the Wall Street Journal put it, “the
survivors of overcapacity downturns often emerge as the big winners.”40 Significant investment in
the face of excess supply, low profits, and perhaps financial fragility is required by any firm that
hopes to be a winner.
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The point that must be stressed is that sluggish aggregate demand growth and chronic excess
aggregate supply reinforce one another as part of Neoliberalism’s vicious circle. The more competitive
pressures develop, the more they force firms to cut wages, smash unions, substitute low for high
wage labor, and pressure governments to cut social and infrastructural spending so that taxes on
corporations and the rich can be slashed without creating budget deficits. But these actions
constrain global aggregate demand ever more tightly, creating yet stronger competitive intensity,
and so on.
This destructive cycle operates in financial as well as manufacturing markets. In the wake of
continuing financial deregulation, large commercial banks have entered into competitive wars both
with investment and brokerage firms and with one another.41 Increasingly, high profits can be
obtained in the financial sector only by creating new products or new markets -- which merely
postpones the problem unless the temporary scarcity rents generated are solidified through
oligopolization -- or by taking on ever more leverage and ever greater risk. We have witnessed both
processes unfold in the last two decades.
Keynes, Minsky and Marx, among others, taught us that unregulated financial markets are
inherently speculative and volatile, subject to irregular cycles of over-optimism followed by
excessive pessimism.42 But it is not just excessive optimism or belief in fairy tales about the “new
economy” that has led large banks to write incredibly risky loan and derivative contracts or
undertake dangerous off balance sheet commitments. Faced with the ongoing loss to other
institutions of their corporate loan business -- their main source of profit, banks were forced to
undertake greater risk, or decline in size and power. It should not come as a shock to find that they
chose greater risk.
 Global liberalized financial markets are thus both highly speculative and coercively competitive.
It is therefore not surprising that banking and currency crises generated by risky and reckless
lending and financial investment patterns break out with increasing frequency. Only continuous
IMF and Central Bank bailouts (at enormous taxpayer expense) have prevented the self-destruction
of the global financial system, and sustained the profits of multinational financial enterprises. But
both recurrent crises and subsequent ‘rescues’ erode global demand growth by creating deep,
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extended recessions in the crisis areas, adding high risk-premiums to interest rates, and forcing
more and more countries to submit to the austerity macro policies mandated by the IMF and
World Bank.
The recent Asian financial crisis is one example of the way that structural contradictions
within the global system create financial instability and real sector crises in the developing world.43
Slow growth and below average profits reduced the rate of growth of gross investment in the
developed world in the Neoliberal era, while rising incomes at the top of the income pyramid
sustained the flow of funds seeking investment outlets. Financial deregulation, the removal of
capital controls across the globe, and technical innovation made it possible for an increasing
proportion of these funds to flow across national boundaries in search of high returns in the less
developed world. The flow of short term portfolio investment and bank loans to developing
nations accelerated sharply in the 1990s, especially to East Asia.
To prevent the sudden withdrawal of these short-term funds, recipient nations must avoid
significant deterioration in their trade balance. To eventually repay the loans, they must run
substantial export surpluses for extended periods. But, it is increasingly difficult for developing
countries to maintain healthy trade balances because slow global growth, especially in developed
countries, constrains the total demand for exports, while fierce competition in global
manufacturing markets constrains the profit margins and market share any particular country can
hope to maintain. Consider South Korea, a major recipient of short-term foreign bank loans.
Semiconductors are one of Korea’s largest export earners. In 1996 excess supply and fierce
competition drove semiconductor prices down by almost 80%, contributing to a sharp increase in
the trade deficit (from 2% to 5% of GDP) that helped trigger the Korean financial crisis. Most of
the area experienced a similar problem. South and East Asian export growth fell by two-thirds in
1996 from the rates achieved in 1994 and 1995.44
Thus, slow growth and low industrial profit rates in the North helped stimulate financial
flows to Asia, but the combined impact of slow growth and coercive competition made it almost
impossible for the recipient countries to sustain the trade performance needed to service their
loans and hold on to their portfolio investments from the North. Having forsaken import
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regulation as part of the liberalization process, affected countries felt they had little choice once the
crisis hit but to accept IMF intervention and the deep, import slashing, recessionary policies it
brought. Paradoxically, the structural contradictions of the Neoliberal Regime ended up
destroying, at least temporarily, the high growth and profit rates that attracted the funds to Asia in
the first place.
Destructive Competition in Action: The Global Auto Industry
Consider the global auto industry. It is one of the most important industries in global trade
and investment, and it has massive scale economies -- Ford and General Motors had total assets of
$ 275 billion and $229 billion respectively in 1997. It is also among the most transnational of all
businesses -- six of the world’s twelve top transnational firms ranked by the size of foreign assets are
auto companies.45 Slow trend global growth, new entry, and modest exit has created a huge global
capacity overhang in autos. Business Week reported that at least three quarters of the globe’s forty
auto makers are “drowning in debt and glutted with factory capacity: the industry can make 20
million more cars and trucks a year than it can sell.”46 Pricewaterhouse Coopers, a consulting
company, concludes that global capacity utilization, currently below 70%, is growing; their estimate
for 1990 was 80%.47 But economies of scale and fixed costs, including development costs, are huge
and growing rapidly; estimates of current minimum efficient production scale range from 2 million
to an astounding 4 million cars per year.48 With such large fixed costs, high excess capacity has
killed profits in almost all auto markets other than the US in the late 1990s, triggering “cutthroat
pricing on top of the overcapacity problems.”49 Even in periods when sales rise, intense
competition to gain the lower fixed costs per unit that higher volume brings, holds down prices
and profit margins. According to the Wall Street Journal, “Economics 101 doesn’t explain this
market where robust demand isn’t necessarily a license to raise prices. The huge fixed costs
involved in developing new vehicles and running big auto factories means auto makers feel
compelled to maintain – or expand market share.”50 Pricewaterhouse Coopers observed that
“overcapacity represents a huge cost burden in an industry whose costs and profitability are
particularly sensitive to levels of capacity utilization.” In their view:
Competitive pressures in the vehicle industry have been intense. Overcapacity, cost
reduction, the proliferation of niche models, development of full range brand strategies by
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the [vehicle manufacturers] and shortening product cycles have reduced the protection
offered by traditional market strengths.51
This constant pressure on prices and profits has induced fierce cost cutting. Production is shifted
to low wage sites, technology is used to sharply reduce employment and labor cost per car,
governments are pressured to extend generous subsidies and tax abatements, and companies wage
war on their workers to weaken or destroy unions and cut wages and benefits.
Meanwhile, faced with excess capacity and minuscule profit margins, companies pour
investment capital into the industry, a phenomenon you won’t find in Economics 101 either. For
example, Ford, GM and Daimler Chrysler are again investing heavily in Asia, even though sales are
not expected to return to 1996 levels until 2004. “With the US and European markets maturing,
the Big Three are counting on Asia for growth.” But since Japanese firms will not cede this market
to them, Asia “has turned into a war of attrition, with the Big Three aiming to be among the
winners.”52 BMW “in five years had poured nearly $3 billion of investment into Rover” in a
desperate attempt to keep it in the game.53 GM recently invested $1.5 billion in Saturn to try to
maintain its competitiveness, and thereby avoid losing the $5 billion it had previously invested.54
Daimler-Chrysler, Volkswagen, and Renault plan to collectively invest $5 billion in production
facilities in Mexico over the intermediate future.55 The Wall Street Journal reports that GM is
building new plants with huge capacity in Brazil in order to cut costs in a bad market, introduce
new models, and produce inside the potentially large Brazilian market: “by containing losses now
and pushing ahead with plans for investment in new products, GM hopes to be ready to cash in
when the market recovers”.56 It observed that “many experts warn of vast overcapacity in Asia and
South America if auto makers complete even a fraction of already announced plans for new
plants,” yet adds that these experts “acknowledge the [competitive] advantage of being the first
producer” in local markets.57 The Economist sees the cost cutting pressures associated with
“globalization” as a key culprit behind the burst of new capacity; the “rush to build plants all over
the place has merely added to the capacity mountain.”58 All the large auto makers are investing
heavily in the development of new models, a hugely expensive undertaking thought to be required
for expansion, or even maintenance, of market share.
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This is mostly coerced investment, required to remain in the ongoing zero sum game that
will eventually determine which firms survive. Its main effect is to continuously recreate industry
excess capacity and debt burdens, maintain downward pressure on wages and employment (not
just in the auto firms, but in the industries that supply them), and restrain the growth rate of
aggregate demand.
In Prospect: Re-Oligopolization On a Global Scale
The most powerful firms in the most fiercely contested global core industries have not been
content to let this process follow its destructive course to the bitter end. Excessive competition that
continues long enough in the kinds of industries I have designated as core, will eventually begin to
identify winners, who, when they are few enough in number, will seek to restore the cooperative
relations necessary to raise the industry profit rate. In Marx’s words, “competition produces
monopoly.” Since the mid 1990s, core global industries have experienced a ongoing merger and alliance
wave of historic proportions. Since 1994, M&A activity has skyrocketed; in 1999 global merger deals
were worth $3.4 trillion (with $1.7 trillion in the US), about six times their 1994 value. There was
$850 billion of cross border mergers in 1999, ten times the 1991 amount. According to the
Financial Times, globalization is the most important cause of the merger wave.59
Coerced investment spending increased rapidly just when profits were weakest, creating or
exacerbating problems of excessive indebtedness for many firms. The rapid pace of investment is
dividing the competitors into those who are in decline and those who remain relatively strong.
Though technological superiority influences this sorting process, it is mainly those with deep
pockets, not efficiency in design and production, that are winning this life and death struggle. It is
cash rich GM, Ford, and Daimler-Chrysler who are winning the global auto wars. Business Week
reported recently that GM and Ford have $11 billion and $21 billion, respectively, in cash
holdings.60 Flush with the profits made in SUVs and light trucks in the US in recent years, and
with earnings generated by their financial operations, GM and Ford have been roaming the world
in search of desperate, debt ridden auto firms to buy on the cheap. They have done well in this
pursuit.
The global auto industry has entered a phase of hectic consolidation -- through mergers,
41
and through alliances of every form imaginable. In 1998, the year that saw the $40 billion merger
of Chrysler with Daimler-Benz, a total of $80 billion was involved in global auto mergers. This was
over twice the value of 1997 mergers.61 In 1999, total global auto deals totaled $71 billion, led by
Ford’s investment of $6.5 billion in Volvo, and Renault’s expenditure of $5.4 to essentially take
control of debt burdened Nissan (though only 37% of the shares were purchased).62 “Merger
mania in the auto industry continues at a fever pitch,” notes Business Week, but adds that there
aren’t many firms left to grab:“the field of remaining candidates is down to a handful.”63
Companies are merging and allying to “cut costs by shedding labor,” and to “trim capacity, reduce
competition, and hike prices.”64 In January 1999 Business Week argued that in a decade or so,
there would only be six surviving super-firms in the global auto industry.65 One year later, the Wall
Street Journal could already identify six global super groups in autos that among them accounted
for 74% of global auto production.66 Formal mergers are only one form taken by this consolidation
process. Auto companies have created a vast array of alliances and joint ventures among producers
and suppliers. These alliances create inter-firm cooperation or, to use a currently popular phrase,
“coopetition,” across a wide range of operations -- R&D, new product development, marketing,
production, platform sharing, and parts supply.
We are thus at a disorderly, intermediate stage in the consolidation process. Coerced
investment continues to reproduce excess capacity, and competition continues to severely
constrain prices and profit margins. Yet the industry is, at the same time, building cooperative
relations across numerous firms and many aspects of business. The financially strong are eating the
weak, and the consolidation process has gathered enormous momentum. At some point, if
consolidation continues, more universal corespective arrangements may be put in place. The
winners will eliminate global excess capacity (by shutting down the losers’s factories), and be back
in position to regulate investment, control price, and restore good profit margins.
Two key questions need to answered.  Will the current momentum toward consolidation
overcome the forces of global stagnation that destructive competition is itself helping reproduce?
That is, can the ongoing efforts to re-oligopolize core industries be generally successful if aggregate
demand continues to be constrained by the same forces that are creating the consolidation
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movement?   And, if the re-oligopolization of global core industries is successful, what government
institutions -- if any -- will force these global super groups to act in the interest of the majority of the world’s
people?
IV. Conclusions
 This essay has focused on theory, but its analysis has obvious policy implications.
Neoliberal economic theory is deeply flawed in all its forms – macro and micro theory, the theory
of financial markets, and development theory. It is, therefore, a misleading and dangerous guide
for institution building and government economic policy making. Sensible alternative economic
theories suggest that global Neoliberalism is moving the world towards a disappointing and
perhaps disastrous economic future, a forecast that is not inconsistent with the economic
experience of the past two decades. They also imply that markets must be socially embedded and
the broad outlines of economic development socially determined if the economic interests of
working people and the majority of citizens are to be served and protected. All post war economic
success stories, whether in the advanced or in the developing worlds, relied on extensive state
guidance of market processes. Of course, social regulation of market activity, while necessary, does
not guarantee economic progress.
The logic of this essay implies that the state must play an important role at both macro and
micro levels of economic activity. Thus, the first issue to be addressed concerns political power and
the determination of economic policy priorities. In the current environment, capitalist class forces
dominate the political process, and their world view, Neoliberalism, determines which economic
ideas are ‘respectable’ and sets the parameters within which political economic discourse takes
place. Progressive economic change will therefore not be possible unless and until the political and ideological
balance of power shifts significantly.
Progressive, labor oriented political movements are needed to reduce the influence of large
corporations and wealthy individuals on the setting of political priorities, increase the political
influence of workers and the majority of citizens, and thoroughly democratize the political process -
- in substance as well in form. Without a dramatic change in the balance of class political power, it
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will not be possible to hammer out new “social contracts” that reject Neoliberalism and create
socially regulated economic systems. Government control over cross border capital flows and direct
foreign investment must be crucial parts of this political power re-alignment. As Keynes taught us, it
is the credible threat that money, physical capital, technology, and jobs will flee the country if
government policies are not pro-business that has given capital the power to determine political
priorities in the Neoliberal era. Capital controls can help reverse this perverse political power
relation between capital and the majority of citizens.67
Turning to policy specifics, governments must reassert their responsibility to regulate
aggregate demand, and shift their policy priorities so that full employment growth once again is the
dominant goal.68 Growth is needed not just for its direct benefits, but to create important
preconditions for dynamic efficiency in core industries. Reasonable growth is also necessary to
make high road labor relations and a more progressive income division between capital and labor
possible, but growth alone cannot assure this outcome. In most national corporate ‘cultures,’
management instinctively leans toward low road options. Therefore, society must provide a set of
incentives strong enough to force firms to adopt the high road. Labor needs an institutional
foundation powerful enough to make large corporations understand that it is better to have
workers as allies than as enemies. Empowering labor in pursuit of the high road requires not only a
strong union movement, but sustained full employment, a labor oriented government with
effective collective bargaining laws, and a social safety net that gives workers an attractive exit
option in their negotiations with business and raises the minimum living standard for the weakest
in society. None of these requirements can be met without appropriate government action. Such
policies require the implementation of effective national and\or international regulation of cross-
border capital flows, so that neither industrial or financial capital can undermine them by
threatening to run away. These conditions were present, at least in modest form, in many of the
countries that participated in the prosperity of the Golden Age. National governments still have
the power to accomplish these tasks; what they lack is the will to do so.
Assuming we avoid a global financial collapse and/or depression, many core industries are
likely to re-oligopolize and restore cooperative relations. But who will make sure that the necessary
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balance between cooperation and competition is maintained, and that global oligopolies do not abuse their
great market power? In the Golden Age, dominant firms in core industries had deep roots in one
country and were at least potentially subject to that country’s political will. For example, political
influence on the behavior of giant firms was one of the foundations of the East Asian “miracles.”
Area governments were involved in the coordination of large firm investment spending. This
facilitated the rationalization of excess capacity, the prevention of cutthroat pricing in deep
recessions, the forced exit of poorly performing firms, limits on entrance (so key firms could take
advantage of economies of scale), efforts to prevent over-investment in buoyant growth phases, and
protection against profit margins that were too large to be justified by dynamic efficiency
considerations. The point is obviously not that all government efforts to regulate and coordinate
the behavior of large firms in countries such as Japan, Taiwan and Korea were successful, but that,
on average, they were effective enough to generate development records that were the envy of the
rest of the less developed world. Prior to the Neoliberal era, even advanced country governments
often used anti-trust and other policies to intervene when core industries acted against the pubic
interest.
In the current era, however, decision making power in consolidating core industries is
likely to be distributed across truly transnational giant firms or multi-firm super groups. Yet there
are no democratically constituted transnational government agencies capable of ensuring that these
new oligopolies act in the public interest.69 In many global industries, barriers to entry are
becoming virtually insurmountable. For example, no new firm could possibly compete with the big
six auto super groups. What is to prevent these super groups from forcing workers and
governments across the globe into a desperate competition for the good jobs, advanced technology,
and high productivity which only they possess? It is difficult enough for governments to create and
effectively implement a structure of incentives and punishments to guide industry development
when the firms involved are clearly subject to their political jurisdiction. The creation of effective
forms of social regulation of the emerging global corporate super groups, whether at the national
or transnational level, is one of the great policy challenges of our times.70 At a minimum, all
governments should restore their ability to regulate the conditions under which firms and money
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can enter and exit their borders, which will enhance their ability to regulate all businesses that
operate domestically. Collectively, the US and European governments certainly could subject all
important global businesses to effective regulation, if they had the political will to do so.
Successful development by poor and middle income countries cannot take place under the
Neoliberal rules of the game. No one has developed successfully without extensive state
interference in market processes. Developing country governments must rely on industrial policy,
and therefore on capital controls and tightly regulated financial markets, to have a chance at
equitable growth. A collective effort to restore the right to utilize these policy tools is most likely to
be successful, but as Malaysia recently demonstrated, even a small, isolated country can impose a
regime of capital controls effectively on its own if necessary. The restoration of capital controls in
both advanced and developing countries will also reduce exchange rate instability and make global
financial crises, and the deep recessions which follow in their wake, much less likely.
The arguments in favor of fully liberalized domestic and global financial markets are so
weak they border on the absurd. Liberalization in the US and, to a lesser extent in Europe, has led
to rampant financial speculation. For example, the US stock market has recently experienced price
to earnings ratios more than twice their historic average. The reversion of stock prices to their
normal relation to profits will induce a serious American recession and possibly a global financial
crisis. Advanced country governments should tighten their regulation of domestic financial
markets dramatically. The liberalization of even short term capital flows in East Asia, where many
countries have savings rates in excess of 30 percent of national income, was inexcusable. It helped
create the conditions that made the Asian financial crisis possible. Liberalization of short term
capital flows benefits Northern financial institutions and the world’s wealthy elites and injures
everyone else. Former World Bank Vice President Joseph Stiglitz recently asked a question that
almost no one in authority has had the courage to answer publicly, though everyone knows the
correct answer.
Did America and the IMF push [financial liberalization] policies because we, or they,
believed these policies would help East Asia or because we believed they would benefit
financial interests in the United States and the advanced industrial world? And, if we
believed our policies would help East Asia, where was the evidence? ... There was none.71
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The international institutions that currently manage global integration -- the IMF, the
World Bank, and the WTO -- are saturated with Neoliberal ideology and dedicated to the pursuit
of the interests of global finance and multinational corporations. They must be replaced with new
institutions that support egalitarian growth and encourage state-guided development models. They
also must guarantee the right of nations to control capital flows. And, mimicking the medical
maxim that the first obligation of a doctor is to do no harm, they must stop imposing austerity
macroeconomic policy on countries who need their help in times of crisis.
 In sum, the evaluation of the current global economic trajectory presented here is quite
pessimistic. If the world continues down the path of Neoliberalism, economic prospects for the
majority of people, in both developed and developing nations, are dismal. More of the same
disappointing performance that we have experienced in recent decades may be the most likely
scenario, but it is also quite possible that serious political and economic instability will erupt -- just
as it did in 1930s, in the last market dominated era. There is thus an urgent need to reverse
course. It is essential that the Neoliberal path be rejected, and replaced with domestic and
international public and private institutions and policies dedicated to the pursuit of the security
and prosperity of the majority of the population, rather than the maximization of the wealth and
power of national economic elites.
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